Are the PUPs Pauline’s Progeny?  
Populism and political alienation among Australian voters

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1 Introduction

In 1996, on the cusp of his inevitable electoral victory, John Howard faced the embarrassment of distancing the Liberal Party from an outspoken Ipswich fish and chips shop owner who had been endorsed by the Liberal Party for the Queensland seat of Oxley. Pauline Hanson had complained vociferously that Aborigines enjoyed privileges denied to non-Aborigines and the Liberal Party moved to disendorse her, but it was too late to stop her appearing on the ballot paper as a Liberal candidate. She won the seat and sat as an independent in Parliament. Rising in the chamber to deliver her maiden speech, Hanson made no attempt to moderate her views: “Present governments are encouraging separatism in Australia by providing opportunities, land, moneys and facilities available only to Aboriginals.” To this target, she added another: “I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of being swamped by Asians.” Hanson went on to found her own party, One Nation, which won 11 seats in the Queensland Parliament in 1998, with 22% of the vote. At the Federal level, One Nation captured 9% of the vote in 1998 and 5.5% in 2001.

In 2013, on the cusp of his equally inevitable electoral victory, Tony Abbott also faced another Queensland renegade conservative. Billionaire Clive Palmer, a former member of the Queensland National Party, set up his own party, the Palmer United Party, and went on to win three senate seats. Palmer himself won a seat in

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the lower house. Overall, PUP gained 5.5% of the Federal vote. Unlike Hanson, the PUP campaign was not dogged by racism or xenophobia, and unlike Hanson his maiden speech was largely dull and boring. Amidst the vacuous statements about economic growth and reviving Australia's fortunes, Palmer did articulate one interesting sentiment: “The entrenchment of the two party system in this country not only threatens democracy, it destroys the creativity of the nation. It robs from all of us the benefit of each other’s ideas and innovation”. In essence, Palmer United Party was positioning itself as The Alternative; the answer to a broken democracy. However, it was not long before the racism and xenophobia emerged. Palmer’s celebrated outburst on national television, that the Chinese were ‘mongrels’, and (then member) Jacqui Lambie’s bizarre outbursts against Muslim Australians, showed that PUP had indeed channelled the ghost of Pauline Hanson. In an equally bizarre moment, Hanson herself popped out of the woodwork to denounce Palmer.

The themes of this paper cover several areas which Murray Goot has explored over the years: immigration, multiculturalism, nativism, Indigenous affairs, political alienation, minor parties, the One Nation Party, and more broadly, voting behaviour and public opinion. In a few of journeys I have joined Murray; for others Murray has had the company of other colleague such as Tim Rowse (Goot 1984; Goot and Rowse 1994; Goot and Watson 2001; Goot 2002; Goot and Watson 2005; Goot and Rowse 2007; Goot and Rowse 2008; Goot and Watson 2011; Goot 2013). Where Murray and I have often explored datasets such as the Australian Election Study and the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes using various regression modelling strategies, in this paper I take a different tack. I employ a strategy well trodden in the French-speaking world, but less well utilised in the Anglosphere: Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). I use this approach to explore the ideological social space occupied by those voters in Federal elections who chose One Nation in 1998 and 2001, and those who chose the Palmer United Party in 2013. My core question is whether One Nation and PUP shared the same ideological social space? It is in this sense that I ask the question: are the PUPs Pauline’s progeny?

To define that ideological social space I examine a range of opinions which generally characterise right-wing populism: on the one hand, there is the broad area of political alienation, which includes disenchantment with the political system or the established political parties as well as political apathy. On the other hand, there

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1 Palmer has been one of the LNP's largest donors until he resigned in 2012. In 2011-12, he had donated $176,700 to the LNP (Cairns Post, 27 April 2013, p. 2).
2 As Jeremy Sollars in the Warwick Daily News opined: 'I strongly believe that part of the reason politics in Australia today is so dull—and why most of us are disengaged from it, switching over to cooking shows—is because our parliaments are filled with professional pollies... Clive, on the other hand, has actually done some stuff, and voters will welcome him as a breath of fresh air to cut through the stale fart of politics. The major parties were quick to laugh at Clive yesterday. But they will be crapping their collective daks because they know Clive offers a genuine point of difference.' Daily News 27 April 2013, p. 8.
3 One recent example of this methodology in the Australian context was Reimondos, Evans and Gray 2011, who examined the HILDA data using MCA.
is another broad area of social discontent directed at changes underway in modern Australia. These span immigration policy, Aboriginal policy, law and order, and the economic direction of the country. While there seems little doubt that both One Nation and the Palmer United Party were populist—in the sense that they presumed to speak for ‘ordinary people’—the extent to which they embodied right-wing populism has been a more open question. As Murray Goot (2005) himself argued, the first set of issues—immigration and Aboriginal policy—did indeed position ONP as a party of the right, while concerns with economic issues suggested other descriptions might be more appropriate. In the case of PUP, economic pronouncements have also been a regular part of their platform from the outset, though exactly how one might describe their eclectic mix of policies is something of a challenge.

To assist with thinking about populism and political alienation, the literature on European right-wing populism is particularly helpful. The experience on the other side of the Atlantic is less informative, largely because the libertarianism which lies at the heart of movements like the Tea Party is quiet alien to the Australian political landscape. Consequently, I begin with a brief overview of some of the elements which have surfaced in right-wing populism in Europe, particularly racism and xenophobia, economic insecurity and political alienation. This overview assists in pinpointing those items from the Australian Election Study (AES) which can be used to map the ideological social space for Australian voters. I define voters by reference to their senate vote in the Federal election, largely because this made all minor parties (such as One Nation and Palmer United) available as a choice for voters. The data employed is that collected by the (AES) in 1998, 2001 and 2013 (though I only report results for 1998 and 2013). The AES provides a comprehensive and consistent survey of voters' attitudes and, despite its shortcomings, provides the only feasible data source for exploring these concerns.

2 Right-wing populism: some European insights

Writing in the early 1990s Hans-Georg Betz identified some of the key elements in the rise of right-wing populism in Western Europe. Dissatisfaction with the political choices on offer was central, though this was just as likely to lead to voters abstaining or voting informally. For this discontent to be channelled into voting for new parties, several other elements were also relevant. These included xenophobia, ‘if not overt racism’, authoritarianism, a positioning of the ‘common people’ against ‘elites’, and a profound suspicion of the pace of economic and social change. Indeed, Betz argued that right-wing populism could be viewed as essentially a working-class response to the process of postindustrialization, with its economic dislocation and the consequent immiseration of large segments of the industrial working-class (Betz 1993).

In his review of responses to Pauline Hanson, Murray Goot observed an interesting change over time in emphasis in her policy pronouncements, from a policy on race and ethnicity to an increased concern with the economy, particularly jobs (Goot 2005, p. 106).
The ‘post-industrial’ thesis is incomplete, and fails to move beyond the focus on technology, with its risk of naturalising economic change. The political dimension is crucial, as Wolfgang Streeck showed in his analysis of neo-liberalism. As he argued, the latter has effectively severed the linkage between democracy and capitalism that was embodied in the post-war settlement, particularly the post-war welfare state. As Streeck observed:

Today ... doubts about the compatibility of a capitalist economy with a democratic polity have powerfully returned. Among ordinary people, there is now a pervasive sense that politics can no longer make a difference in their lives, as reflected in common perceptions of deadlock, incompetence and corruption among what seems an increasingly self-contained and self-serving political class, united their claim that ‘there is no alternative’ to them and their policies. One result is declining electoral turnout combined with high voter volatility, producing ever greater electoral fragmentation, due to the rise of ‘populist’ protest parties, and pervasive government instability (Streeck 2014, pp. 40–41).

An important part of the xenophobia within European right-wing populism was ethnic and racist ideology. Jens Rydgren, for example, argued that one can discern a ‘master frame’ behind right-wing populism. It was based on ‘ethnonationalist xenophobia, based on the doctrine of ethnopluralism, with anti-political-establishment populism’. Because the overt racism of the old master frame had been stigmatized by Europe’s experiences with fascism, the new frame needed to refashion this form of biologically-based racism in a more socially acceptable form. Ethnopluralism, also called ‘cultural racism’, provided the means to achieve this:

in order to preserve the unique national characteristics of different peoples, they have to be kept separated. Mixing different ethnicities only leads to cultural extinction ... contrary to the traditional conception of racism, the doctrine of ethnopluralism is not hierarchical: different ethnicities are not necessary superior or inferior, only different and incompatible (Rydgren 2005, p. 427).

As well as Euro-scepticism, anti-immigration sentiments have been at the heart of right-wing populism in the United Kingdom. The success of the anti-immigrant party, the UK independence Party (UKIP), in the 2014 European elections sent shock waves through the political establishment. As Eric Kaufmann observed, this outcome was linked to other developments in British politics over the last decade and a half which had shattered the “complacent belief that Britain was immune to far right advances of the European variety”. These included the emergence of the British National Party (BNP) and the rise of immigration ‘to first or second spot
among the electorate’s priorities’ (Kaufmann 2014b, p. 247). Kaufmann canvassed a range of ‘materialist’ reasons for this rise—including elements of the post-industrial thesis mentioned above—and then noted that the recent research highlighted that ‘the politics of immigration is, at root, a matter of culture and identity’ (Kaufmann 2014b, p. 247). As Kaufmann concluded, in discussing the contributors to a forum on UKIP and immigration:

Our contributors accept that material strains and political alienation matter for popular attitudes, but many place the accent on the dramatic cultural changes brought on by immigration (Kaufmann 2014b, p. 250).

3 Methodology

Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) is an extension of Correspondence Analysis (CA), and is an ideal methodology for analysing categorical data, particularly that drawn from large survey datasets (Greenacre 2007). It is inherently inductive and seeks to establish patterns in the multiple relationships between a large number of variables. For this reason, it has been embraced by French researchers as the embodiment of geometric data analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, pp. 1–4). MCA has a close affinity with principal components analysis, the method commonly employed to discern patterns in continuous variables.

One of the best known exponents of this approach was Pierre Bourdieu, whose seminal work, Distinction, made use of CA, and whose later work made use of MCA (Bourdieu 1984; Bourdieu 2008). One of Bourdieu’s main insights was to use CA and MCA to visualise social space and the network of inter-relationships between different social categories, such as taste and cultural production (Clausen 1998, p. 37; Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, pp. 4–12). As Bourdieu explained in 1991:

I use Correspondence Analysis very much, because I think that is is essentially a relational procedure whose philosophy fully expresses what in my view constitutes social reality. It is a procedure that ‘thinks’ in relations, as I try to do with the concept of field (quoted in Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, p. 5).⁶

This emphasis on relations had led Bourdieu to reject the reductionism which was implicit in many regression methods of data analysis. As he had earlier argued in Distinction:

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⁵ Since 2002 immigration and race issues have ranked first or second in the Ipsos-Mori polls (Kaufmann 2014, p. 1072).

⁶ Bourdieu’s concept of the field was a particularly useful way of refashioning that age-old sociological tension between structure and agency in a more pragmatic manner. With this concept one could explore how social actors were structurally positioned and yet still exercised agency because of the relative autonomy of that field.
The particular relations between a dependent variable (such as political opinion) and so-called independent variables such as sex, age and religion, or even educational level, income and occupation tend to mask the complete system of relationships which constitutes the true principle of the specific strength and form of the effects registered in any particular correlation. The most independent of ‘independent’ variables conceals a whole network of statistical relations which are present, implicitly, in its relationship with any given opinion or practice (Bourdieu 1984, p. 103).

This rejection of regression methods is insightful. Two common approaches to understanding the relationship between independent variables are, in the case of linear regression, the analysis of variance and the comparison of R-squared measures; and in the case of non-linear regression, the comparison of likelihood ratio measures. Both of these approaches allow one to arbitrate among the variables as to which are most ‘important’. On this basis, large numbers of variables are dropped (in the pursuit of parsimony) and variables which are highly correlated are either removed (keeping the most salient) or converted into scaled items. Another approach to independent variables—the inclusion of interaction terms—can be very useful for understanding how subgroup effects may differ and how some variables act as ‘effect modifiers’. Some researchers have even seen the potential of regarding interaction terms as ‘contextual variables’. Again, this is a limited approach to looking at the inter-relationships between these variables because it only explores that interaction within a directional framework (namely, effects). Structural equation modelling (SEM), which is certainly more open to exploring the relationships between independent variables, is also largely reliant on assumptions about the direction of dependency in these relationships. If one wishes to remain agnostic on questions of causality or dependency, and yet still explore these inter-relationships, MCA presents itself as an ideal methodology. One recent exemplary use of MCA, which highlighted its interpretive potential, was a study by Brigitte Le Roux and her colleagues on class and cultural division in the United Kingdom (Le Roux, Rouanet et al. 2008).

In the case of the AES, MCA provides the ideal method for constructing the ideological social space which characterises right-wing populism and political alienation. There are a large number of survey items touching on immigration and ethnicity; there are items touching on race (Aborigines); and there are a large number of items touching on political engagement. Most of these items are consistent over time, which allows one to construct this ideological social space in the same manner for 1998, 2001 and 2013, the relevant years for the One Nation / PUP comparison. As with all cross-sectional surveys one cannot be definitive about changes over time, since such changes may reflect changes in the composition of the sample rather than changes in the sentiments held by the underlying population. Only longitudinal data would adequately deal with changes over time.

MCA methods seek to find homogeneity in groups of individuals, by measuring the distance between responses to a range of questions. Large numbers of questions can be analysed in this way, since there is no requirement for parsimony (as in a regression framework). By applying singular value decomposition (SVD) to matrices
based on these responses, MCA constructs clouds of points for both the categories of the variables, and clouds of individuals. In the case of individuals, the distance between the points in a cloud reflects the dissimilarity between their patterns of responses. The set of all these distances for an individual determines the placement of the point which represents them. Individuals who choose infrequent categories are usually located at the periphery of the cloud. In the case of the categories, a similar logic applies where the distance between categories (also called ‘properties’ or ‘modalities’) is determined by the dissimilarity in responses and their relative frequencies. Again, the less frequent a category, the further the category point is from the centre of the cloud. Mainstream views—in the sense that large numbers of respondents endorse them—are found towards the origin of the axes. Whether the centres of various subclouds of individuals coincide with this origin provides one of the interpretive tools for understanding the data.

The categories which constitute the cloud are termed ‘active’ categories, while other categories—such as the demographic or sociological characteristics of respondents—can be deemed ‘supplementary’. They play no role in the construction of the cloud or the derivation of its dimensions, but they can be used to aid with interpretation. By mapping these supplementary categories—such as voting behaviour or educational level—onto the map of categories, one can explore how these particular groups of individuals ‘fit’ into the social space. In the case of this study, by exploring the patterns which emerge when individuals are located in this ideological social space one can draw conclusions about the linkages between particular groups of individuals and the ideological universe they inhabit.

Before looking at the findings, a number of other methodological points are worth making. The AES has large numbers of missing answer, a problem which rapidly compounds if a large number of variables are analysed at the same time. Using listwise (or case-wise deletion) on can see a dataset of nearly 1900 observations fall to under 1200. The implications of this for bias are obvious. In recent years researchers have increasingly made use of various multivariate imputation methods to deal with this problem. For this particularly study, two approaches were used: multivariate imputation using chained equations (MICE) and a more recent development which uses MCA itself, regularized iterative MCA (see van Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011; Husson and Josse 2013; Josse 2012).

While MCA is primarily descriptive and focused on interpretation, it also has an inferential side. If one is interested in generalising from the AES sample to the larger population, then it is necessary to assess, for example, whether the results for One Nation and the Palmer United Party in these data have arisen by chance alone. With MCA one can conduct a ‘typicality test’, whereby the group being assessed (eg PUP voters), with a certain sample size $n$, is compared with subsets of the reference population with the same size $n$. By considering a set of possible subclouds, one can

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7 In the case of this analysis, categories which fall below 2.5% are ‘ventilated’, that is, excluded from playing a constitutive role in the construction of the clouds.
then pose the classic inferential question as to where the PUP subgroup fits within this sampling distribution of all subgroups. The relevant test statistic can yield a p-value and one can adjudicate on the 'degree of typicality' of the subgroup, that is, whether the PUP group can be 'assimilated' to the reference population, or whether it is atypical of it (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, p. 82).

4 Findings

The 1998 AES

In the case of the 1998 data, the first three dimensions revealed by MCA accounted for 47% of the variance, with more than half of that (27%) due to the first dimension. Maps of these dimensions are shown in Figures A1 and A1 in the Appendix. All of the categories were coded such that larger numbers (4,5) reflected more conservative / alienated views, while smaller numbers (1,2) reflected more progressive / less-alienated views, and middle numbers (3) reflected the ‘neither agree nor disagree’ positions. These maps show that a range of responses coded 4 and 5 were well to the right of the map, while those coded 1 and 2 were on the left, suggesting that the first dimension was a progressive through conservative spectrum. In the case of the second dimension, it was evident that the 1 and 5 coded responses were at the top of the map, while many of the 2, 3 and 4 coded responses were at the bottom. This suggests that this axis was an attachment measure, reflecting the strength of an individual’s sentiments. Finally, the third dimension can be interpreted as a political alienation and apathy spectrum.

Figures such as these, which show the relationships between all the variables in the map, can be somewhat crowded. In order to see patterns more clearly, it is useful to group these variables in a more thematic way and this is done in what follows. Figure 1, for example, shows variables related to race and ethnicity according to the progressive / conservative spectrum (dimension 1) and the attachment spectrum (dimension 2). The shape of the symbols indicate the coding of the variable (with higher numbers for the more conservative positions). A useful way to decode these maps is to regard the positions furthest from the origin as ‘fringe’ positions, and those closer to the origin as more mainstream. Thus Figure 1 suggests that conservative fringe locations are considerably further from the origin than are progressive fringe locations (about twice as far). It is important to keep in mind that this categorisation reflects the sample as a whole. Later, when we look at the cloud of individuals, we will discern where particular subgroups are located within this topography.

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8 The analysis for this paper was conducted in R, using the mca function from FactoMineR, and the plotting functions from ggplot2 (R Core Team 2014; Husson, Josse et al. 2014; Wickham 2009).

9 Note that this coding has no effect on the results; it is just a convenience for ease of interpretation. The a priori designation of progressive / conservative is also just a convenience. Thus some questions had their coding reversed, again to make interpretation easier.

10 I use the terms axis, dimension and spectrum interchangeably when discussing a single dimension, and the term quadrant when discussing two dimensions. While the social space identified here is three dimensional, the maps are, by necessity, two dimensional.
In looking at race and ethnicity on the right-hand side of the map, immigration issues were located further from the origin than were Aboriginal issues, while the racial/ethnic self-identity variable was closest to the origin (it only covered the range from 1 to 4). Some immigration issues which were more moderately held (“agree”, or “too far”, rather than “strongly agree”, or “much too far”) were closer to the origin. This included questions which dealt with the level of immigration and sentiments about “fitting in”. When it came to the progressive end of the spectrum, Aboriginal issues were alongside immigration issues at the ‘far’ left-hand side (though this distance was much closer to the origin than was the case for the right-hand side). These distances are in terms of the progressive / conservative dimension; if we recast this in two dimensions—and include the strength of sentiment—then the strong endorsement of these progressive values are somewhat further away (indicated by their location in the top corner of the quadrant).

It seems clear that immigration issues constituted the “far right” of this ideological social space much more than did law and order issues, or economic issues. While there are only a few such items available in the AES data, they are all much closer to the origin. What is more, only the stronger forms of endorsement (“strongly agree”) are actually on the right-hand side of the map. It is interesting to note that concerns about the level of immigration are not exclusively on the fringe of the far right: those who opted for “too far” (as opposed to “much too far”) were much more mainstream than far right. They were, moreover, at the lower end of the attachment scale.

Eric Kaufmann has observed with regard to British politics, ‘net migration and the salience of immigration share a close numerical relationship’ (Kaufmann 2014b, p. 249). In the case of the AES, some 43% of respondents overall endorsed the view that immigration levels were too high, and among the PUP voters the figure was 59%, slightly above Nationals voters at 54% and Liberal voters at 51%. Only among ALP voters—at 40%—and Greens voters—at just 17%—was there minority opinion on this matter. However, consistent with the results of the MCA analysis, the more extreme position (“much too far”), was only endorsed by 21% of voters overall, but significantly, by 32% of PUP voters. Thus while concern about immigration levels was a concern of the mainstream right, heightened concerns were more symptomatic of the far right.11

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11 While the questions would have been worded differently, the opposition to immigration within British public opinion was reported at 80% in 2014 (Kaufmann 2014, p. 1072).
Figure 1  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 1 and 2: Race and ethnicity (AES 1998)

Figure 2  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 1 and 2: Economics and Crime (AES 1998)
In the case of alienation and apathy, Figure 3 shows this dimension on the horizontal axis and the progressive / conservative spectrum on the vertical axis (which is more informative than using the attachment axis). Two interesting features emerge: Among conservatives (top half), apathy is much further from the origin than is alienation. Those furthest along this spectrum (towards the right) are not interested in politics and did not follow the election in the media. Sentiments which reflect alienation more specifically (“governments only look after themselves”) were closer to the origin, and in this sense, more of a mainstream sentiment. On the progressive side of the spectrum (bottom half), sentiments of apathy and alienation were both much closer to the origin and were more intermingled.\textsuperscript{12}

In summary, these findings suggest that to define the “far right” in this ideological social space, one needs to focus on issues of immigration and political apathy, rather than race and ethnicity more broadly, or political alienation more broadly. The latter both have a “mainstream” presence which is not unique to the far right.

When one moves from the cloud of categories to the cloud of individuals one super-imposes the supplementary variables onto the map. These are the variables which are passive, playing no constitutive role in the construction of the social space represented by the map, but which are illuminating for understanding how individual

\textsuperscript{12} Note that the item about “caring which party won” was only offered on a 3-point scale.
characteristics (for example, sociological elements) relate to this social space. In terms of the themes of this paper, voting behaviour is a supplementary variable and one can map its patterns onto this ideological social space. Before looking at the voting patterns, a number of important sociological variables are worth considering. Some of these are shown from Figures 4 to 6 while others are not shown, but available on request. These figures show the different responses to these sociological variables superimposed on the cloud of individuals, with the mean response shown as a larger dot-point and concentration ellipses shown as dashed lines.13

Both education (Figure 12) and occupation show consistent results: those with university qualifications and those working in managerial or professional occupations were located further along the progressive spectrum. Individuals further along the conservative end were those with vocational qualifications and those in blue-collar occupations. In the case of alienation and apathy, the results were closer (though on the attachment axis, the university-educated stood out).

![Figure 4 Cloud of individuals, by educational qualifications (AES 1998)](image)

While the results for income suggested that the gradation from lower income to high income mapped onto the conservative / progressive spectrum (with lower income responses more conservative), the starker results emerged from self-assessed financial circumstances (Figure 5). Those individuals living in households where finances were a lot worse off than in the previous year were located much further from the origin on the conservative side. In terms of alienation / apathy, the income gradations showed little variation, but the households experiencing a financial downturn were further into the alienation / apathy space. In terms of economic vulnerability, the other item in

13 A concentration ellipse is not to be confused with a confidence ellipse. The former is a ‘descriptive summary’ of the subcloud (see Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, pp. 87–88).
the AES (in 1998) was the respondents’ concern that someone in the household might become unemployed. On this measure, those respondents who were very worried were also located considerably further along the conservative axis (Figure 6). Finally, respondents living in cities were to found much further into the progressive space, while those in country towns were further into the conservative social space.

These various results are what one might expect and consistent with most sociological analyses of contemporary Australia. What they do highlight, however, is that the progressive / conservative spectrum did not easily translate into a left / right
spectrum, and that alienation and apathy were not as strongly stratified (by various sociological categories) as one might expect. It was certainly not as strongly stratified by subgroups as was the progressive/conservative spectrum.

Turning now to voting behaviour, Figure 7 shows both dimensions of the ideological space, with the mean location of the voting responses of individuals. These data are also shown in Figures 8 and 9 as concentration ellipses around the subclouds of each group of voters. Individuals who voted for the Australian Democrats were more solidly located in the progressive social space, though Liberal party supporters also had a presence in this space (and were further from the origin than ALP supporters). Liberal voters were more concentrated around the origin—suggesting a preponderance of mainstream attitudes—whilst ALP voters were more diverse, drawing support from those on the ‘moderate right’ as well as those from the ‘committed left’ (the top left quadrant). By contrast to the Liberals, National Party supporters were more solidly located in the conservative space, while One Nation were overwhelming located in that conservative space. It is clear from these data that ONP voters had a much closer ideological affinity with the National Party, rather than the Liberals, something observed at the time by various commentators. In terms of alienation and apathy, most voters gravitated towards the origin, with one important exception: those voters who voted informally or for minor parties were further into this space.

Typicality tests for these voting results along the progressive/conservative axis are shown in Table 1 and confirm that One Nation voters were highly atypical of the reference population. Their scaled deviation from the origin was substantively large, and the corresponding p-value very small.

In summary, these results suggest that One Nation did indeed strongly attract voters located on the “far right” of this ideological space. In that sense, it was unequivocally a party of the “far right”.

Figure 7 Cloud of individuals, by voting behaviour (AES 1998)
Table 1  Typicality tests for Party voting (AES 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Scaled deviation</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust Democrats</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>-0.728</td>
<td>-12.554</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>-0.314</td>
<td>-9.664</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>4.136</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td>0.597</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2.557</td>
<td>30.569</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or none</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>1.519</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests are for Dimension 1, the progressive / conservative spectrum. For explanation of these tests, see page 7 above. Voting is for the Senate.
One Nation also fielded candidates in the 2001 Federal Election but their vote was nearly halved from their 1998 vote. Over the same period the Greens increased their vote considerably, whilst the Australian Democrats saw theirs slide. The AES data from 2001 is not presented in this paper (for reasons of space) but analysis of these data show that the social space mapped out by One Nation voters in 1998 was still essentially the same in 2001. It is always difficult to gauge changes over time with cross-sectional data, since differences in responses may simply reflect compositional differences in the sample. One way we can partly address this issue is to look at the reported previous vote of the individuals in this sample. Table 2 shows the previous voting patterns of One Nation voters for both 1998 and 2001. In 1998 nearly half of One Nation voters had voted for the Liberal Party in 1996, and just under one quarter had been ALP voters. Another 10 per cent had been National Party voters. This profile of One Nation voters (58% LNP combined) was thus skewed towards the conservative parties since in 1996 about 47% of the broader community had voted for the conservatives. In 2001, ex-Liberal voters still provided a solid reservoir of support for One Nation; at 34% this figure was close to the proportion who had voted for One Nation in 1998 (36%). The figures for ‘leakage’ show the impact of One Nation on the established parties. Because of it’s relatively small vote (less than 10%) One Nation’s impact on the overall standing of the major parties was minor: only 8% of Liberal voters (from 1996) had switched to ONP in 1998, and in 2001 the switch was just 4%. The National Party, on the other hand, being a relatively small party and competing in the same ideological space, felt the impact of ONP more severely. It lost 17% of its voters to ONP in 1998, though by 2001 this had dropped to 5% (presumably because the ‘deserters’ from 1998 had stayed with ONP.)

Table 2  One Nation voters—previous voting (%) (AES 1998, 2001)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Previous vote</th>
<th>Leakage</th>
<th>Previous vote</th>
<th>Leakage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Democrats</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Nation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not vote or informal</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


14 The figure of 19% for the Green deserters reflects a very small sample size (3 respondents out of a total of 21). In 1996, the Greens were still a very minor party winning just 1.7% of the senate vote.
The 2013 AES

By 2013 One Nation was virtually absent on the political landscape. The AES recorded just one third of one percent of its respondents having voted for ONP in the senate. In this section I move to the heart of this paper and ask whether the ideological social space in 2013 was largely the same as that which prevailed in 1998 and 2001. I then ask whether the voters who supported the Palmer United Party in 2013 were occupying the same ideological space that ONP supporters had inhabited.

For the 2013 AES data, the three dimensions revealed by MCA accounted for 48% of the variance, with 26% due to the first dimension, (see Figures A3 and A3 in the Appendix for the full mapping). Again, because of the complexity, the thematic presentation used earlier is employed again (though with an absence of the economic issues because of the omission of several of these items from the survey in 2013). These maps are shown in Figures 10 and 11. Comparing the 1998 and 2013 results suggests that there was considerable overlap between the key elements in the ideological space between these two years. In particular, along the progressive / conservative axis, one finds that immigration issues remained dominant.

Figure 10  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 1 and 2: Race and ethnicity (AES 2013)
It is possible to be more precise about this by examining the squared correlation between these variables and these two axes. As Table 3 shows, the top four issues for 1998 (ranked by this correlation measure) were immigration, and this was the same in 2013 (with just one variable changing position). Aboriginal issues were ranked 5th and 6th in 1998, and by 2013 they had slipped to 7th and 10th. Two of the assimilationist questions from 1998 were missing in 2013 (and these had ranked 8th and 11th), but a close relative—“that migrants make Australian more open”—had moved from 18th to 8th. It is also notable that the strength of these correlation measures for immigration issues were very similar between 1998 and 2013. Questions about tariffs and income redistribution were both missing in 2013 (and had ranked only 24th and 22nd in 1998) but the taxation question remained in roughly the same ranking. The race / ethnicity self-image question was also not repeated in 2013, and it had ranked last in 1998.
When it came to alienation and apathy (Table 4), the ideological space in 2013 was again essentially the same as in 1998, with the top eight issues still in the top eight. The squared correlations were also comparable, with one notable exception. The top item in both years (“interest in politics”), had dropped from 0.48 to 0.34. A comparison of the two tables (Tables 3 and 4) also confirms the interpretation which emerges from the maps, namely that the alienation and apathy dimension was a more condensed one than the progressive / conservative dimension. The average squared correlation for the top ten items on the progressive / conservative list was 0.41 in 1998 and 0.38 in 2013, while the comparable figure for the alienation and apathy dimension was 0.27 (in both years).
Turning to the placing of individuals on these maps, the results are again similar in 2013 to those of 1998 (Figures 12 to 15). Those respondents with university qualifications and who worked as managers and professionals were more solidly located in the committed progressive quadrant, while those with vocational and no post-school qualifications were further along the conservative axis. Similarly, blue collar occupations were further into the conservative space. The household financial situation was similar in 2013, with those reporting finances much worse than the year more before again found at the conservative end. By contrast with 1998, income divisions were more pronounced in 2013, with low income individuals more common in the conservative space and high income individuals more common in the progressive space. The question about fears of unemployment was not asked in 2013, so there were no results for that issue. Finally, the geographical patterns were similar in both years.

Table 4: Alienation and apathy spectrum, variable correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th></th>
<th>2013</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Eta2</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Eta2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INT Interest in politics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTE Would vote not compulsory</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV Followed election tv</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAP Followed election papers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE Care which party wins</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD Followed election radio</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEM Parties make system work</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.182</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIFF No difference who vote for</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGCULT Migrants celebrate Aust herit</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGFIT Migrants should fit in</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARIF tariffs to protect industry</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGCRIM Migrants increase crime</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATDEM Satisfaction with democracy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOBS Migrants take jobs</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUAL Redistribute income wealth</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAND Aboriginal land rights</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAX High tax people dont work</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGEE Migrant EEO</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGECO Migrants good for economy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THINK Parties care people think</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB Govt help for Aborigines</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVSELF Govt look after selves</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGOPEN Migrants make Aust more open</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIGNUM Num migrants into Aust</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENT Stiffer sentences lawbreakers</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURD Death penalty for murder</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIA Closer links Asia</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEO Women EEO</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE Ethnicity race self image</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEB Followed election web</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eta2 is the squared correlation coefficient between this variable and the alienation and apathy dimension. Source: AES 1998, 2013.
Figure 12  Cloud of individuals, by educational qualifications (AES 2013)

Figure 13  Cloud of individuals, by occupation (AES 2013)
Figures 16, 17 and 18 illustrate where the voters in 2013 were located in this ideological space. PUP supporters were located well to the right of the origin, but not as far to the right as One Nation voters had been. The Greens had inherited the territory of the Australian Democrats and their supporters were well to the left of the origin, as well as more strongly attached to these progressive sentiments. Supporters of the ALP and the Liberal Party remained anchored at the origin. While the mean for PUP voters was closer to the origin than was the case for ONP voters, the overall distribution was quite similar, with their concentration ellipse very similar in shape and location. When it came to alienation and apathy, PUP voters were very much
in the mainstream, sharing with other voters a general sentiment of disenchantment with the political system.

![Graph 16](image16.png)

**Figure 16** Cloud of individuals, by voting behaviour (AES 2013)

![Graph 17](image17.png)

**Figure 17** Cloud of individuals, by voting behaviour, dimensions 1 and 2 (AES 2013)
Typicality tests for the 2103 voting pattern along the progressive / conservative axis are shown in Table 5 and confirm that Palmer United Party was highly atypical of the reference population. As with the results for ONP voters (see page 14), the scaled deviation for PUP voters was substantively large, and the corresponding p-value very small. It is worth noting that Greens voters were even more salient on this measure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Scaled deviation</th>
<th>z</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-3.647</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-0.361</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>-1.460</td>
<td>-34.072</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>1561</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>4.928</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>6.227</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other or none</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>18.942</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmer United</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1.264</td>
<td>13.257</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests are for Dimension 1, the progressive / conservative spectrum. For explanation of these tests, see page 7 above. Voting is for the Senate.

In summary, PUP voters in 2013 did not occupy as many locations on the far right as ONP voters did in 1998. Moreover, some of their support base was to be found on the progressive side of the origin. Nevertheless, the bulk of that support was located in the conservative space and the overall complexion of that voter base was very similar to that of One Nation.

Unlike the previous voting pattern of One Nation, the PUP senate vote in 2013 was more reliant on previous ALP voters than conservative voters. As Table 6 shows, some 46% of PUP voters had voted for the ALP in 2010 (at a time when the broader community’s support for the ALP sat at 36%). The combined conservative background of PUP voters was just 29%. Interestingly, PUP voters had also been strong supporters...
of the ‘other’ category (which included independents) in 2010. In terms of impact on
the other parties, it was among these ‘others’ where the main leakage of votes occurred
as PUP’s impact on the major parties was minimal. PUP did, after all, only garner
5.5% of the vote.

Is this voting history consistent with the results of Figure 17 which suggested
PUP had largely inherited the ideological space previously occupied by One Nation
voters? A moment’s reflection suggests that there was plenty of scope for right-wing
ALP voters to shift across to PUP. After all, large numbers of ALP voters occupied
the same conservative space as One Nation, that is, locations relatively close to the
origin but still on the conservative side. Anthony Albanese was clearly wide of the
mark when he declared in April 2013 that: ‘anyone who votes for a Clive Palmer-led
party wasn’t a former Labor supporter, they’ll be a former LNP supporter.’ At the
same time, Albanese was closer to the mark when he added: ‘That’s [LNP] his niche
market. If the far right want to fight with the not so far right in Queensland then
good luck to them’ (Tin 2013). It seems strange that Albanese could not envisage that
PUP could be both far right, and yet draw support from former ALP voters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Previous vote</th>
<th>Leakage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALP</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not vote or informal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Previous vote: % of PUP in 2013 who had voted for the party in
column 1 (in 2013). Leakage: % of party voters (in column 1) from
2013 who voted for PUP in 2013. Current vote is for the Senate,
previous vote is for the House of Representatives. Source: AES 2013.

5 Discussion

Pauline Hanson was notorious for her attacks on the notion of racial or ethnic
separation, manifested in her attacks on ‘Aboriginal privileges’ and multiculturalism.
The name she gave her party, One Nation, exemplified her anchorage in the 1950s
ideology of assimilation. Indeed, she strongly rejected the label racist, largely because
she saw this ideology of assimilation as the embodiment of ‘treating everyone the same’.
At the same time, the racism inherent in the ‘swamped by Asians’ outburst predated
the 1950s and echoed the 19th century Australian phobia of the yellow peril from the
North. The findings above suggest that these sentiments resonated with conservative
voters and that concerns about immigration and its impact on the economy and society
were fundamental elements at the further end of the conservative ideological space.

Unlike the cultural racism of European right-wing populism, the Australian variant
did not rely on an exclusivist self-identity. Assimilation after all, was about the mixing
pot, with all new-comers blending together (though implicitly with the value system
of the dominant Anglo culture.) In the AES, the question which came closest to the European notion of cultural racism was the one which focused on whether respondents based their self image on race or ethnicity. This item was ranked least influential in 1998 as an element constituting the progressive / conservative spectrum (and the question was not repeated in 2013 (see Table 3). Whatever this item actually measured, it was fairly much a mainstream sentiment rather than a signal of attachment to the far right.

Economic insecurity was an important element within European right-wing populism and its presence in the AES is also notable. In terms of household finances and the fear of unemployment, individuals who were vulnerable on these issues were located well to the right on the conservative axis. Unlike the European situation, however, alienation in Australia did not appear to be an essential part of right-wing populism: such alienation was far too mainstream for that. On the other hand, political apathy was much more a hallmark of the far right.

One intriguing question which is left hanging from this analysis is why PUP voters were to be found in essentially the same conservative terrain that ONP had occupied, given that PUP’s pre-election profile was not overtly xenophobic in the way that ONP’s had been. While xenophobia certainly emerged after the election, prior to the election PUP had put forward an eclectic mix of policies which did not explicitly pursue the anti-immigrant or anti-Aboriginal vote. Rather it was the populist strand which dominated the rhetoric in the lead-up to the election: that professional politicians were too busy blaming each other and fighting, and Australia needed a party to ‘bring people together’, provide leadership and grow the economy. What better person to lead the way than a businessperson who knew how to get things done.\footnote{The name of the party was significant. Before settling on Palmer United Party, Palmer had first attempted to register the name, United Australia Party.}

Common themes in the PUP literature prior to the election were the banning of lobbyists, a regional ‘wealth policy’, reductions in taxation, support for veterans and seniors, and the abolition of the carbon tax as well as cleaner and greener energy. When it came to refugees, PUP positioned itself on both the right and the left: it emphasised both ‘border protection’ as well as greater fairness in the treatment of refugees. In many respects this hodge-podge of motherhood statements was typical of a populist agenda, but why it primarily appealed to voters located at the conservative end of the spectrum remains something of a mystery.

It is possible that the more progressive end of that spectrum was already well catered for by the presence of the Greens and the latter’s populism was of a more sophisticated nature. By contrast, the right-wing populism discussed in this paper had much greater appeal to the constituency identified in the literature: low income, less-educated voters, often with blue-collar backgrounds, and who may have felt economically vulnerable. In this sense, while the main competitor for One Nation had been the Nationals, for the PUPs their main competition lay in the other minor
parties who also targeted this constituency, such as Katter’s Australian Party (see Table 6). Finally, Palmer’s personal profile, as a former National Party member and as a ‘maverick’ billionaire, engaged in bizarre stunts and positioned as an anti-politician, may also have signalled to this constituency that PUP offered a ‘fresh choice’.16

Overall, the results of these AES data suggest that while the political landscape had changed in many respects over the last 15 years, the core ideological terrain remained largely the same. The major schisms have been between parties which courted the votes of the most progressive respondents (the Australian Democrats and then the Greens) and those which catered to the sentiments of the most conservative (One Nation and then Palmer United). In this respect, the PUPs are indeed the progeny of One Nation, but in a more diluted fashion. To borrow a term from Clive Palmer himself, the PUPs are best described as ‘mongrels’.

REFERENCES


16 Among his more bizarre behaviour was Palmer’s rejection in 2012 of the idea that he would run for premier of Queensland because he was “too fat”. In 2013 it was reported: ‘Yesterday he said he had lost weight and was set to take on the prime ministership in 2013. “I’m a lot sharper, a lot thinner and much more handsome now”, he said’. (Cairns Post, 27 April 2013, p. 2).


Husson, Francois and Julie Josse (2013). *missMDA: Handling missing values with/in multivariate data analysis (principal component methods)*. R package version 1.7.2. url: http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=missMDA.


Le Roux, Brigitte, Henry Rouanet et al. (2008). ‘Class and Cultural Division in the UK’. *Sociology* 42.6 (December), pp. 1049–1071.


Figure A1  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 1 and 2 (AES 1998)
Figure A2  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 3 and 2 (AES 1998)
Figure A3  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 1 and 2 (AES2 013)
Figure A4  Cloud of Categories, dimensions 3 and 2 (AES 2013)